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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MILTON C. BRANDON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

No. 8473

HOvVARD C. TEAGUE,

Defendant and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties will be designated as they appeared in
the trial court. Defendant does not agree with the statement of f.acts in plaintiff's brief because it is incomplete and, in part, inaccurate. Therefore, the following
statement is submitted:
Although the case has already been before the
Supreme Court of lJtah on defendant's original proceeding in the nature of prohibition (see Supreme Court Case
No. 8232, entitled "Howard C. Teague, Plaintiff vs. the
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District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and Milton C. Brandon,
Defendants"), it is believed that it will be helpful if the
facts are stated in chronological order from the inception of this matter to the present time.
References to the record will be limited to avoid
confusion which might result from the fact that the present record is numbered in red from pages 1 through
10, but page 10 is actually the record which was before
this Court in Case No. 8232, a~d it likewise is numbered
in red, from page 1 forward.
'

On October 1, 1953, plaintiff filed an action against
the defendant in the District Court of Salt Lake County
to recover damages for personal injuries suffered in an
accident which occurred when plaintiff was a guest in
a car driven by defendant. The case was assigned No.
99973. Service of sumn1ons was attempted under the
provisions of the Non-Resident 1\fotorist Act (U.C.A.,
1953, 41-12-8).

On M.arch 25, 1954, defendant filed his motion to
quash the purported service of sunm1ons upon the ground
that the defendant was not a nonresident of Utah at the
time the cause of action arose.
The hearing on defendant's 1notion to quash was held
1n the District Court of Salt Lake County before the
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge, on April 20, 1954.
In support of his n1otion, defendant submitted an afSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fidavit signed by one of his counsel which alleged in substance and effect that for many months prior to the date
of the accident out of which this case arose, the defendant
was residing as a soldier at Deseret Chemical Depot,
Tooele County, Utah, and he could be located there for
personal service for 1nany months before the accident
and many months following the accident. Upon hearing,
plaintiff introduced as an exhibit a copy of the investigative report of the Utah I-Iighway Patrol, which contained
information indicating that the defendant's automobile
carried North Carolina license plates at the time of the
accident. Plaintiff's counsel also testified and defendant's
counsel was cross-examined.
The District Court denied defendant's motion to
quash and the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court
of Utah for an Interlocutory Appeal, which petition was
denied June 1, 1954.
On J ~ly 1, 1954, defendant filed a complaint in the
Supreme Court of Utah in an original proceeding, which
was assigned Case No. 8232. In substance, defendant's
complaint :alleged that the defendant was not a nonresident of Utah at the time of the accident, and the Supreme
Court was urged, to prohibit· the District Court of Salt
Lake County, and Brandon, from proceeding further in
Case No. 99973. The District Court of Salt Lake County
did not plead to the complaint, but Brandon, plaintiff
herein, filed a motion to dismiss. Upon the issues joined
by these pleadings, the matter was argued and submitted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the Supreme Court after preparation and filing of
briefs by plaintiff and defendant.
By decision of the Supre1ne Court filed August 5,
1955, the Court, speaking through its Chief Justice, held:
"We have not been cited to a case holding
that such scant evidence as we have here before
us was sufficient to support a finding of nonresidence, and since the element of jurisdiction
is necessary to Brandon's case, the failure of proof
must lie with him. The trial court erred in denying
the motion to quash ; hence, the alternative writ
heretofore issued will be made permanent."
The remittitur from the Supreme Court was filed
in the District Court of Salt Lake County on August 26,
1955. Five days later plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the same case, Case No. 99973, but the only
amendment consisted of the allegation that tlJ_e defendant "is, and at .all times herein mentioned was," a nonresident of the State of Utah. In the original complaint,
plaintiff had alleged n1erely that defendant "is a nonresident."
At the time the decision of the Supreme Court was
rendered, no formal writ was issued by that Court, prohibiting further action in Case No. 99973. Ho,vever, when
plaintiff filed his a1nended complaint, the fact of such
filing was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court,
which thereafter issued its \Yrit under date of September
20, 1955, commanding the District Court of Salt Lake
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County '"to refrain and desist perrnanently from any
further proceedings in the matter ... "
Upon further consideration, the Supreme Court issued its supplemental writ under date of September 30,
1955, in which the Court's order was :

"Vle command and require the said District
Court of the County of S.alt Lake to refrain and
desist permanently from any further proceedings
in the matter entitled 'Milton C. Brandon, Plaintiff vs. Howard C. Teague, Defendant,' Civil No.
99973, until such time as jurisdiction of the defendant is acquired." (Italics added to show new
matter in supplemental writ.)
After the issuance of the first writ by the Supreme
Court, but before the issuance of the supplemental writ,
the plaintiff, on September 23, 1955, filed a new complaint on the same cause of action. This was given Civil
No. 106335, and the identical language was used as had
been used in the amended complaint which had been filed
August 31, 1955. Service of summons was again attempted in the same language as had been previously
used, and again plaintiff urged the applicability of the
Non-Resident Motorist Act previously cited.
On October 1--l-, 1955, defendant, by special appearance, in C.ase No. 106335, filed his motion to quash service of summons upon the ground of insufficiency of
service, and to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff
upon the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over
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the p·erson of the defendant. The Inotions were grounded
upon the contents of the files and records of the trial
court in the first case, No. 99973, and upon the decision
of the Supreme Court in that case.
Hearing on defendant's motions was had before
District Judge Martin ~1. Larson on November 1, 1955.
The trial court heard arguments of counsel and defendant submitted to the Court for its consideration the files
and records in· Case No. 99973. Although the jurisdiction
of the Court was being challenged by the defendant in
exactly the same fashion as it had been challenged in the
tirst case, plaintiff offered no proof of any kind and the
motion was submitted for decision on the former record.
On November 14, the District Court orally .advised
counsel that "the n1otions are granted and the action
dismissed." This order assumed formal stature on November 18, 1955, when the Court signed and entered a
formal judgment of dismissal in "\Vhich it was ordered
and adjudged that the service of summons be quashed
and the motion to dismiss b~ gr.anted and the action
was ordered dismissed. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
'THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS A NONRESIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE
WAS SQUARELY PRESENTED AND DETERMINED IN
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THE FORMER CASE, AND IS, THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA
AS BE'TWEEN THESE PARTIES.

POINT II.
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT
APPLIED HERE, PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SUST'AIN
THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THE NO·NRESIDENCE OF
DEFEN·DANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDAN·T WAS A NONRESIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF T'HE STATUTE
WAS SQUARELY PRESEN·TED AND DETERMINED IN THE
FORMER ·CASE, AND IS, THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA AS
BETWEEN THESE PARTIES.

In the first action, which was Case No. 99973, plaintiff alleged defendant was a nonresident and that he
was entitled to sue defendant under the terms of the
Utah Non-Resident 11otorist Act. Defendant, by his
motion to quash, ch.ailenged that allegation and, by the
affidavit filed in support of the motion, stated facts in
contradiction of plaintiff's claim.
Thus, the issue was joined upon the first hearing
before Judge Van Cott. The nature of this issue cannot
longer be in doubt, for this Court, in its de·cision in Case
No. 8232, stated as follows:
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"An issue of fact, i.e. whether or not Teague
was a resident at the time of the accident, was
joined at the hearing on the question of jurisdic.
t lOll

•••

"

The Court then went on to say that when a plaintiff attempts to use this method of substituted service,
he must, "upon challenge," prove a prima facia case that
defendant was a nonresident.
The Court then examined the evidence which had
been presented and concluded that there was not sufficient evidence presented to show that Teague was a
nonresident. Determination of that issue by the Supreme
Court was indispensable to its decision sinee, if the defendant were a nonresident at the time of the accident,
defendant's motion to quash ought to have been denied,
but if defendant were not a nonresident at that time, the
motion ought to have been granted.
Defendant contends that the language of this Court
in McCarthy v. State (Utah, 1953), 265 P. 2d 387, leads
irresistibly to the conclusion that the judgment of the
trial court ought to be affirmed.
In that case the Court said :
" . . . A judgment of dismi~sal for want of
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the matters upon
which the ruling was 'YI;ecessarily based."
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As Mr. Justice Crockett commented:
"No reason is apparent why the rule should
be less applicable to a decision denying jurisdiction than to one sustaining it."
In the McC.arthy case the Court was discussing what
had transpired in the United States District Court for
Utah when that Court had entered a judgment of- disInissal upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction of the
action. In concluding that the action of the Federal
Court was conclusive upon the question before this Court,
it was said:
"The issue having been squarely presented
and determined, it is res judicata as between these
parties.''
These principles are clearly applicable to the present
case. The very same issue which was squarely presented
to and determined by this Court in Case No. 8232 was
again before the District Court in the present case. Plaintiff alleged defendant's nonresidence, and defendant
moved to quash .and to dismiss upon the grounds which
he had previously urged in the first case. Plaintiff offered no evidence to the contrary. Since the issue was
determined adversely to the plaintiff in the former case
by the judgment of this Court and since such judgment
is now final, the principle of res judicata ought to apply.
Plaintiff has advanced only one reason why the doctrine of res judic.a ta should not be applied here. In
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summary, plaintiff contends that he did not have the
opportunity to present proof on the question of Teague's
nonresidence on the first hearing because both parties
proceeded under the "erroneous concept of law" that the
burden of proof was on defendant and not plaintiff.
Plaintiff states (Brief, page 4) that the decision by the
Supreme Court in Case No. 8232 "was a reversal of the
procedure which was followed in the trial ... "
Further, it is contended by plaintiff (Brief, page 5)
that:
" . . . The trial court in the original hearing
as well as both parties assumed that on the question of the residency of Teague defendant had
the burden of coming forward and presenting
evidence to sustain his affirmative allegation that
Teague was a resident."
These contentions by plaintiff are not supported by
the record. In fact, the record is directly contrary. The
attention of the Court is called to the transcript of the
hearing on the first case, which is found at page 24 of
the record considered in Case No. 8232, and which reflects the position of the defendant on the hearing before Judge Van Cott on April 20, 1954. At that time
counsel for the defendant stated that he was urging the
court to grant the motion of the defendant, "because I
don't think he (plaintiff) has sustained the burden of
sustaining jurisdiction which I have placed in issue by my
motion .. " After further colloquy between the court and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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counsel for plaintiff, the trial court commented (first
Record, 24) :
"I think you ought to make some showing, Mr.
1\::ing, to controvert his .affidavit here."
If there h.as been any misunderstanding of the effect
of the decision of the Supreme Court, or if there has been
any reliance by anyone upon the proposition that the
burden was on the defendant to show that he was not a
nonresident, such misunderstanding and reliance is
shared only by plaintiff.
Defendant has always asserted, and now asserts,
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish the
jurisdictional facts in his case from the time the defendant filed .a motion to quash service of summons. The
Supreme Court, in its decision in Case No. 8232, stated
that it held the same view, when it said:
"We hold that the plaintiff attempting to
use this method of substituted service must, upon
challenge, prove a prima facia case that the defendant is a nonresident."
The Supreme Court then went on to examine the
record, which, so far as the evidence is concerned, is the
same record as is now before the Court. The Court concluded that plaintiff had not sustained the burden of
proof and that defendant's motion ought to have been
granted. It is difficult to understand how plaintiff can
now .assert that the Supreme Court, on the basis of the
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same evidence, ought to arrive at a contrary decision,
even if it entirely disregarded the doctrine of res judicata.
Plaintiff has had his day in court .on the question
of proving the necessary jurisdictional elements. No
sound reason is set forth in his brief why he ought to be
given another day in court. If he is allowed another, and
if, upon that occasion, he likewise failed in his burden,
what is to prevent him, under his theory, from asking a
further chance to try again ~
The very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is
to put at rest the contentions of p~arties when an issue
has been litigated. As the Supreme Court of the United
States stated, through Mr. Justice Roberts:
"Public policy dictates that there be an end of
litigation; that those who have contested an issue
shall be bound by the result of the contest, and
that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties ... " Baldwin
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283
U.S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. ed. 1244.

POINT II.
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT
APPLIED HERE, PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN
THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THE NONRESIDENCE OF
DEFENDAN·T.

Even if the doctrine of res judicata were not apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plicable in this case, there is still a further hurdle which
plaintiff has not crossed in his attempt to obtain jurisdiction in the present action.
He .alleged that defendant was a nonresident. Defendant, by his motion based upon the record in the
former case, again attacked that allegation, in addition
to raising the claim of res judicata. Again, therefore,
plaintiff was put upon the burden of proof. But, when
the matter came on for hearing before Judge Larson,
plaintiff presented no evidence of any kind in support of
that burden. Thus, it is clear that he failed again to
sustain the burden of proof put upon him.
It will not suffice for plaintiff to imply, as inferred
from his brief, that he was not aware that he had a
duty to go forw.ard with the proof. Even if he were not
so aware of his duty in the first hearing, there can be
no doubt that he is conclusively presumed to know that
he had that burden in the light of the decision of this
Court in its Case No. 8232. Nevertheless, although the
decision had been in existence for nearly three months at
the tilne of the he.aring in the present case, plaintiff was
silent when offered the opportunity to present evidence
on the question of Teague's residence. The trial court,
it \vill be recalled, did not enter judgment preemptorily,
but took the matter under advisement. Both parties were
allowed every opportunity to present any evidence or
theory, and yet plaintiff remained silent.
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Even in the absence of the doctrine of res judicata,
therefore, the case novv is in the same posture as when
it was first considered by this Court in Case No. 82'32.
The issue was joined, plaintiff had the burden of proof,
and failed to sustain it.

No re.ason is suggested why

this Court, on this record, should reach a conclusion different from its decision of August 5, 1955.
What plaintiff actually seeks here is not a second
chance, but rather a third chance to prove the same issue.
He had his first chance on April 20, 1954. He did not effectively utilize that opportunity. He had his second
chance on November 1, 1955, before District Judge Larson, and again failed to present any evidence of any
kind bearing upon the question of residence. He now asks
this Court for the right to have a further opportunity to
litigate the same issue. It is respectfully submitted that
he has no such right.

CONCLUSION
The following quotation expresses defendant's position on this entire matter:
" ... Public policy and the interest of litigants
.alike require that there be an end to litigation,
which, without the doctrine of res judicata, would
be endless. The doctrine ... rests upon the ground
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that the party to be affected ... has litigated ...
the same matter in a former action in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it .again to the harassment and
vexation of his opponent ... " 30 Am. J ur. 910-12
(Judgments, Sec. 165).
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
trial court was correct and should be affirmed by this
Court, and that the litigation on this jurisdictional question be thereby terminated.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for Respondent
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